Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

6-2015

Sovereignty and Subversion
Alice Ristroph
Brooklyn Law School, alice.ristroph@brooklaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Natural Law Commons
Recommended Citation
101 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2015)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBVERSION
Alice Ristroph*
"too great liberty" and those who
who advocate
ETWEEN
contend
forthose
"too much
authority," Thomas Hobbes found it difficult
"to pass between the points of both unwounded."' It does not appear that
he cleared the gauntlet successfully. One of the many curiosities in
Hobbes's work is its provocation of two diametrically opposed, and
seemingly inconsistent, criticisms. When Leviathan was first published
some 350 years ago, Hobbes's very name became an epithet in polite
circles, evoking the horrors of atheism, libertinism, and worst of all, defiance to established authority.2 Today, the same work that Hobbes's
contemporaries denounced as a "Rebel's Catechism" is widely viewed
as an unequivocal and misguided defense of an authoritarian and absolutist government. Hobbes's descriptions of the need for a powerful
sovereign are many and memorable enough to have eclipsed, over time,
his endorsements of a few specific rights to resist the sovereign. But
Hobbes's contemporaries did not overlook the subversive strands of his
work, and neither should we. In particular, there is much to be learned
from the juxtaposition of Hobbes's account of law-a command made
with authority, to one obliged to obey 4-and his account of punishment-an act of violence that the target has a right to resist.5 This juxta-

B

Stephen and Barbara Friedman Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School (Spring 2015);
Professor and Eileen Denner Research Fellow, Seton Hall Law School. I am grateful to the
participants in the September 2014 Symposium on Jurisprudence and (Its) History, especially Mark Murphy, Charles Barzun, and Dan Priel.
' Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 3 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651)
[hereinafter Hobbes, Leviathan]. I have modernized spelling, capitalization, and punctuation
here and in the quotations throughout the rest of the piece.
2See generally Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes 40, 55 (1962) (noting initial widespread criticism of Hobbes for his "scepticism . . . general irreverence.... [and]
atheism," and discussing contemporary warnings of the danger Leviathan posed to the authority of government and religion).
3 See John Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, or the Great Whale, in Leviathan: Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes 115, 145 (G.A.J. Rogers
ed., 1995) ("Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebells catechism?"); David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes on the Authority of Law, in Hobbes and the Law 186,
186-87 (David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole eds., 2012) (describing "the orthodox view" of
Hobbes as an authoritarian).
4 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 183.
Id. at 93.
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position illuminates some recurring jurisprudential questions about the
relationship of law to coercion, and the possibility of strictly descriptive,
nonevaluative legal theory.
Hobbes's account of law, like his account of punishment, does not fit
well into our existing scholarly categories. I shall argue that the fault lies
in our categories, and not in Hobbes. He was neither a legal positivist
nor a natural law theorist, at least not as we usually use these labels. He
adopted neither a retributive nor a consequentialist justification of punishment. Yet his account of human interaction, particularly with respect
to law and punishment, captures actual experience better than the more
familiar alternatives. Moreover, the space for subversion in Hobbes's
theory may make his account more normatively appealing than it has
seemed to modern liberals.
The Article is organized around three questions about Hobbesian theory: What is law? What is its relationship to punishment? And what are
the implications of Hobbes's theory for contemporary efforts to describe
law or the relationship of law to punishment? The first of these questions
has been tackled by Hobbes scholars, of course, but Hobbes's legal theory is still so widely mischaracterized, sometimes even by Hobbes scholars, that it is worth returning to his claims. The second question has received much less attention, perhaps because a right to resist punishment
seems so discordant with the authoritarian Hobbes we know, or think we
know. And the third question has received still less attention, for contemporary jurisprudence scholarship rarely cites anyone who wrote before Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. I hope to show that, in many instances, Hobbes has been misread; 6 even more importantly, I hope to
persuade scholars of jurisprudence that what Hobbes actually said is
worthy of their engagement.
I. LAW AS COMMAND, RECONSIDERED
Hobbes favored brief and pithy formulations when he could offer
them, and this predilection has helped produce the somewhat distorted
understanding of Hobbes's work that prevails today. First, his most
widely circulated one-liners tend to focus on human conflict and the
need for violent suppression of bad behavior. "Covenants, without the
6Were I writing a

longer Article, or feeling more intemperate, I would advance the claim
that the history of legal theory is a history of misunderstandings or misappropriations of
Hobbes and his ideas.
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sword, are but words."7 "[I]n matters of government, when nothing else
is turned up, clubs are trump."8 And of course, in the state of nature,
"every man is enemy to every man," and "the life of man [is] solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short."9 Hobbes said, and meant, these things;
how much easier it is to repeat the quips than to see what else Hobbes
said. Indeed, Hobbes's fondness for quips like these and for concise,
simple statements may have actually contributed to misunderstandings
of his arguments, for in his work it is easy to read a few paragraphs on a
given topic and think one has the whole picture. At the same time, in legal theory, thinkers who have borrowed from (and distorted) Hobbes are
much more widely read than Hobbes himself, which further obscures his
lessons. Thus, while Hobbes scholars have produced several careful and
illuminating accounts of his theory of law,o it is nonetheless worth disentangling (again) what Hobbes actually said from the ideas typically
attributed to him in the legal academy.
"Law in general," says Hobbes in Leviathan, "is not counsel but
command; nor a command of any man to any man, but only of him,
whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him."
This sentence-usually just its first eight words-is cited often to link
Hobbes to Austin, Bentham, and the tradition of legal positivism. For
those already familiar with Austin's theory of law as commands backed
by sanctions, it is all too easy to assume Hobbes is saying the same
thing. Austin linked command, sanction, and obligation in one tidy bundle: The power to punish disobedience was what made a command a

7 Hobbes,

Leviathan, supra note 1, at 117.
Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws
of England 140 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1681) [hereinafter Hobbes,
Dialogue].
9 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 89.
10 See, e.g., Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, at 186; Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal
Point of View, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1211 (2006); Mark C. Murphy, Was Hobbes a Legal
Positivist?, 105 Ethics 846 (1995). Unfortunately, others have purported to expound "a
Hobbesian conception of law" while barely referencing Hobbes. See Robert Ladenson, In
Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 134, 134 (1980). Ladenson
offers "a Hobbesian analysis of the notion of governmental authority" without citing or discussing Hobbes's own lengthy discussion of authority as a bilateral principal-agent relationshi? between an author and a representative. Id. at 137.
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 183.

1032

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1029

command, and what generated obligation.12 Many a scholar has read
Hobbes on law through Austinian glasses.13
For Hobbes, though, command, sanction, and obligation are three independent and severable concepts. A command does not necessarily
threaten punishment or produce obligation; indeed, it is distinctive for its
absence of any appeal to the listener's self-interest. In the chapter before
the oft-quoted discussion of law as command, the difference between
command and counsel is stated clearly. Commands are orders to act or
refrain from acting "without expecting other reason than the will of him
that says it;" thus one who commands "pretends thereby his own benefit."l 4 Counsel, in contrast, is advice that purports to serve the interests
of the person counseled-although Hobbes recognized that those who
offer counsel may in fact have selfish or otherwise ill intentions." "Do it
because it is good for you" is counsel; "do it because I said so" is a
command. Thus a command is not an effort to induce compliance by
threatening punishment; a command makes no reference to the listener's
interests at all. Nor do commands themselves produce or presume obligation, as indicated by Hobbes's distinction between law and .other
commands: Law is not the command of any man to any other, but "only
See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 21 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) ("A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded.");
id. at 24 ("[C]ommand, duty, and sanction are inseparably connected terms . .. each embraces the same ideas as the others . . . ." (emphasis omitted)). Contemporary scholars tend to
equate "command theories" of law with an Austinian emphasis on sanction. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2054, 2109 n.213 (1995)
("To the extent that the command theory relies upon the rather unreal notion that every law
is necessarily backed by a sanction, it is easy to see why Hart and any other positivist would
rejiect it.").
3 See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 83-84 (1953)
(arguing that sanction was intrinsic to Hobbes's account of law because it is implied by the
word "command"); Roger Berkowitz, From Justice to Justification: An Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 611, 614 (2011) ("[A]s does Austin, Hobbes understands law as a command. .. ."); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 885-86 (1996) (linking Austin, Bentham, and Hobbes as a
part of a single tradition framing law as commands). But see Mark C. Murphy, Hobbes (and
Austin, and Aquinas) on Law as Command of the Sovereign, in The Oxford Handbook of
Hobbes 4-7 (Al P. Martinich & Kinch Hoekstra eds., forthcoming 2015) (on file with author) (describing "a great gulf between Hobbes's and Austin's [command] theories of law").
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at
176.
15 See id. ("[H]e that gives counsel, pretends only (whatsoever he intends) the good of
him, to whom he gives it.").
12
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of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey

him." 16

Strip away Austinian assumptions, and it should be clear that for
Hobbes, to describe laws as commands is not to make any claim about
sanctions, or obligations, at all. It is instead a claim about reasons for action, a claim related to and perhaps foreshadowing the now familiar Razian account of legal authority. Joseph Raz is often credited for developing the idea that law generates exclusionary reasons for action: The fact
that a law has commanded a given action is itself a reason to exclude
from consideration all other reasons for or against taking the action.17
That is the nature of a command according to Hobbes, or at least its aspiration. A command demands obedience simply by being issued, without attempting to persuade compliance and notwithstanding any inclinations of the listener to act otherwise. Raz would certainly distinguish his
account from a Hobbesian one, but unfortunately Raz often relies on interpreters of Hobbes rather than Hobbes himself, and even interpreters
as distinguished as H.L.A. Hart have injected Hobbes's theory with
claims he did not make.18
So what role do obligations and sanctions play in Hobbes's account of
law, if they are not implicit in the concept of a command? As an initial
matter, it is important to notice that for Hobbes, political obligation is

" Id. at 183.
17 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 30 (1979).
18 See Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification,
in Authority 115, 116-19 (Joseph Raz ed.,
1990) (relying on Robert Ladenson, supra note 10, and H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham
(1982)). Raz relies on Hart's account of Hobbes, which begins well enough: "The commander characteristically intends his hearer to take the commander's will instead of his own
as a guide to action . . . ." Id. at 118-19 (quoting Hart, supra, at 253). But Hart then claims
that the "expression of the commander's will . .. is intended to preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of the merits pro and con of doing the act." Id. at 119
(quoting Hart, supra, at 253). Raz objects: "Surely what counts, from the point of view of the
person in authority, is not what the subject thinks but how he acts." Id. I suspect Hobbes
would agree with Raz here, rather than Hart's reinterpretation. For Hobbes, "[c]ommand is
where a man says, do this, or do not do this, without expecting other reason than the will of
him that says it." Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 176 (emphasis added), cited in Hart,
supra, at 253. It seems quite clear that Hobbes's claim is not that after a command, reasons
do not matter; instead, the claim is that a command asserts itself as the only reason that matters for action. Elsewhere, Hobbes makes explicit the very point Raz raises against Hart: Actions matter for legal compliance, not beliefs. "For if the law declared, be not against the
Law of Nature ... [a subject is] bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men's
belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands . . . ." Id. at 198.
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prior to law.1 9 Laws are a particular kind of command, made by one with
authority to one formerly obliged to obey. The issuance of a law can
create new, specific obligations (to pay taxes of a given amount, for example, or to refrain from ingesting specific intoxicants), but these legal
obligations depend upon the prior general political obligation to obey.
Of course, Hobbes had a specific account of the basis of political obligation and its limits, and that political account proves important to
Hobbes's legal theory.2 0
The theory of political obligation in Leviathan is well known, and less
frequently distorted than Hobbes's theory of law, so I will summarize
only briefly here. For Hobbes, all obligations, including the political obligation to obey the sovereign, arise from voluntary choice.2 1 When I re22
nounce a right, or transfer it to another party, I take on an obligation.
The right that each of us renounces in order to generate political obligation is a very broad right of nature to do whatever I deem necessary to
preserve myself. This prepolitical right includes a right to use preemptive aggression.23 The social contract is an agreement among all persons
(save the sovereign) to transfer each person's natural right of self-

19 A few other readers have emphasized this point. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Hobbesian
Legal Reasoning and the Problem of Wicked Laws, in Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st
Century 49, 54 (S.A. Lloyd ed., 2013); David Gauthier, Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law, 16 Can. J. Phil. (Supp. Issue) 5, 7-8 (1990).
20I flag here a broader methodological point to which we will return: There is reason to
doubt the severability of legal theory from political theory, and reason to mistrust the claims
of some thinkers to offer "purely descriptive" theories of law. Law-at least the kind of law
that is the subject of jurisprudence, as opposed to the laws of physics, divine law, and Murphy's law-is the product of organized political entities. It both relies upon and helps maintain those entities, and it is doubtful that we can give an account of the nature of law without
delving into the nature of the state. And if there are too many kinds of states to speak coherently of the nature of "the" state, there are probably too many kinds of law to speak coherently of "the" nature of law. Moreover, given that those who theorize law are also always
members of organized political entities and participants in the social practices that constitute
law, there is reason to question the characterization of any legal theory as "pure description."
But more will be discussed on these issues in Part III.
21 See, e.g., Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 150 ("[T]here being no obligation on any
man, which arises not from some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free.").
22 Id. at 92-93 ("[W]hen a man has in either manner abandoned or granted away his right,
then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his duty, not to make void that
voluntary act of his own .... ").
23 Id. at 87-88. It bears emphasis that Hobbes's right of nature is not just a right to do what
is in fact necessary for self-preservation, but a right to make the judgment about how to best
preserve oneself. Id. at 91.
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governance to the sovereign.24 The social contract thus obliges each person to obey the sovereign. And, as Hobbes is usually presented today,
the sovereign's power to legislate and the subject's obligation to obey
are each absolute, or nearly so. The sovereign is the sole legislator, and
is not itself bound by the civil laws.25 The sovereign is not a party to the
social contract, and so cannot breach it; thus subjects cannot avoid their
obligation to obey by accusing the sovereign of breach of contract.2 6 In
his discussions of political obligation, Hobbes often appeared much
more concerned with refuting those who might advocate an excess of
liberty than he was with quieting those who called for excessive authority.
It turns out, though, there are limits to subjects' obligations to obey,
limits which are generated by Hobbes's account of human motivation
and, I believe, by his normative principles. These limits to obligation
then generate limits to what can count as law, and they force a wedge
between law and punishment. Hobbes posited that though we could and
should give up a right of self-governance, we could not renounce a core
right to preserve ourselves in the face of immediate threats. All voluntary acts must aim at some good to the actor, and "therefore there be
some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other
signs, to have abandoned, or transferred." 27 First among these inalienable rights is "the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take
away his life" or even the right to resist "wounds, and chains, and imprisonment." 28 More generally, we cannot oblige ourselves to take selfdestructive actions; Hobbes maintains that we cannot oblige ourselves
even to take certainpotentially fatal actions, such as serving in combat.29
Scholars have puzzled over this claim: Is Hobbes saying that it is psy24 Id. at 120. Hobbes imagines the social contract as a transfer of the right
of selfgovernance, not the right of self-preservation. This distinction proves important, as explained
below.
25 Id. at 184.
26 Id. at 122-23.
27
281Id. at 93.
Id.
29 There is some ambiguity as to whether this exception applies
to all potential conscripts
or only those who provide substitutes, as well as "men of feminine courage." See id. at 151
("[A] man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign
have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse,
without injustice; as when he substitutes a sufficient soldier in his place . . . . And there is
allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected), but also to men of feminine courage.").
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chologically or conceptually impossible to renounce a right of selfpreservation?" Or just that it would never be rational to renounce that
right? 1 None of these explanations is completely satisfying, and I have
suggested previously that Hobbes's claim here is at least partly a normative argument about how we should understand each other. 32 Whatever
the normative content of this claim of inalienability, it is clear that
Hobbes took the claim seriously, with profound consequences for his
political and legal theory.
Put simply, the inalienability of the right of self-preservation sets limits to obligation: We cannot oblige ourselves to submit to violence or to
refrain from resisting it. "A covenant not to defend myself from force,
by force, is always void."33 This implies a right to resist punishment, a
right held even by the guilty.3 4 It also seems to generate content-based
limits to what counts as law. Suppose an otherwise legitimate sovereign,
seeking to save money on geriatric care, were to promulgate a putative
law requiring those over ninety years old to commit suicide. Or suppose,
slightly less morbidly, that a statute required honest and complete testimony from anyone the state chose to summon as a witness before a
court, including a criminal defendant. Or suppose, most realistically of
all, that a putative law required registration for military service and service if called. Do any of these commands have the status of law? Hobbes
made clear that we are not obliged to obey these sorts of commands.
Without obligation to obey, the command seems to lack the status of

See, e.g., Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan 30-32 (2010)
(explaining the conceptual and psychological interpretations of Hobbes's claim).
3
See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 Pac. Phil. Q.
332, 334, 338-39 (2001).
32 Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 601,
628-30 (2009); see also Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 93 (stating that if a man seems
to transfer his right of self-preservation, "he is not to be understood as if he meant it").
3 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 98.
34 I discuss this right in more detail in Part II, but it bears emphasis now that the right to
resist punishment is not in any way legally enforceable. Hobbes defined a right as a blameless liberty-a prerogative to act without violating principles of justice or morality. It is not
at all a Hohfeldian conception of right, which implies a correlative duty for someone else.
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 747-50 (1917).
3 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 151 ("If the sovereign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself.. . yet has that man the liberty to disobey. If
a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself,
he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it . . . .").
30
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law. Notably, Hobbes would maintain that the sovereign has the power
simply to kill nonagenarians, or those who refuse military service, or
even those innocent of any criminal offense. But power is not law." To
exercise a power requires no cooperation or participation from the subject. Power is indifferent, in Hart's terms, to the internal point of view.
Law, in contrast, requires a voluntarily assumed obligation; it is a twoway street rather than the product of unilateral action. 40 And according
to Hobbes, there are some paths that subjects simply will not and cannot
take-namely, the paths to obvious destruction.
Contemporary readers who care about "the law," and not necessarily
about Hobbes, may ask, but was Hobbes right? Surely the Selective
Service Act's registration requirement is legally valid (even if unjust), as
were specific conscription acts that required draftees to report for military service. But these objections are raised from the perspective of
purely descriptive jurisprudence, and, as we will see in Part III, that is
not necessarily a promising vantage point.
For now, I ask the reader to stay within Hobbes's project. We have
seen so far that Hobbes did not argue that sanctions are intrinsic to the
concept of law, and still more radically, he saw political and thus legal
obligation as circumscribed by a right of self-preservation that actually

36 See Murphy, supra note 10, at 850-52. If legal positivism is understood
as the view that
legal validity depends only on the source of a law, and natural law theory as the view that
legal validity is at least partially dependent on the content of the law, then Hobbes seems a
natural law theorist rather than a legal positivist. See id. at 849. I am not sure, though,
whether it is useful to try to place Hobbes in either category, for reasons I elaborate on in
Part III.
3 See Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 148, 151. Hobbes claims that a sovereign who
kills an innocent subject does the subject no injury, or no wrong (though this brutal sovereign does violate the law of nature and does injury to God). Id. at 148. This claim bolsters
the view of Hobbes as a totalitarian, of course, but it should be understood in the context of
Hobbes's definition of "injury." "Injury" refers to injustice, which in turn implies the violation of some prior covenant or agreement. See id. at 104. Since the sovereign does not contract with his subjects, he cannot "injure" them.
3 See, e.g., id. at 153 (distinguishing power from law).
3 See Hart, supra note 18, at 253.
40
Another oft-quoted Hobbes quip on law: "It is not wisdom, but authority that makes a
law." Hobbes, Dialogue, supra note 8, at 55. The line is used to distinguish Hobbes from earlier natural law theorists, fairly enough, but it also must be understood in light of Hobbes's
claims about authority. Authority is always artificial, in that it is a human artifice, and it requires persons, plural. One person cannot establish authority by himself. Cf. Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 23 (1972) (discussing the artifice involved in authorizing a person to act on behalf of another).
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gave subjects a right to resist punishment. A right to resist should lead
us to ask: Could a Hobbesian sovereign even enforce Hobbesian law?
II. ENFORCEMENT

Readers have sometimes mistaken Hobbes to have a sanction-based
theory of law because he seemed to endorse so strongly a sanction-based
theory ofpoliticalpower. Political power is based on a covenant, the social contract, but again, "covenants, without the sword, are but words."4 1
Hobbes was adamant that the role of the sovereign was not simply to
legislate rules for conduct, but also to enforce them, chiefly by threatening punishment to the disobedient. 42 Civil laws, "in their own nature but
weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by
the difficulty of breaking them." 4 3 The function of sanctions is to encourage obedience, as is clear already in Hobbes's definition of the term
punishment: "[A]n evil inflicted by public authority, on him that has
done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience."44 It is not clear, though, that this is a conventional deterrence argument. Hobbes sometimes spoke of punishment
as a "danger" or a "terror,"4 5 suggesting a deterrence function; however,
he also advanced a more nuanced explanation in which punishment disposed "the will of men . .. to obedience" by providing assurances
against exploitation to those who comply with the law.4 6 Whether
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 117.
Id. at 120-21 ("[B]y this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to conform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against
their enemies abroad.").
43 Id. at 147.
4 Id. at 214.
45 Id. at 147 ("danger"); id. at 215-16 ("terror"); see also id. at 117 (claiming that one purpose of a commonwealth is to "tie [men] by fear of punishment to the performance of their
41

42

covenants").
46 Alice Ristroph, Hobbes on "Diffidence" and the Criminal Law, in Foundational Texts in
Modem Criminal Law 23, 31 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014). The details of this argument are
not central to this Article, but I have set them forth elsewhere:

Hobbes describes a first-performer problem: each party to a contract is rightfully re-

luctant to perform his duties first, for the second party may then take the benefits of
the agreement but refuse to perform his contractual obligations. It is not that either

party is necessarily evil, or disinclined to keep promises; but each has no reason to
keep promises without a system in place that guarantees that others will keep promises
also.. .. Importantly, men seem to trust the institution of punishment regardless of

2015]

Sovereignty and Subversion

1039

through simple deterrence, or also through providing assurances, sanctions encourage compliance.
A function or purpose of punishment is not necessarily a justification
of it. Hobbes was confident that punishment served an important purpose; indeed, he often suggested that punishment, or at least a credible
threat of punishment, was necessary to political stability. To a strict
utilitarian, the usefulness of punishment might be enough to justify it,
but Hobbes was not a strict utilitarian. So after defining punishment in
terms of its function, he raised the separate question: "[B]y what door
the right, or authority of punishing in any case, came in." 47 And his answer, though unconventional, is consistent with the subject's right to resist punishment. The sovereign's power to punish is a manifestation of
an extrapolitical, natural right to do violence against any potential
threat. 48 Everyone but the sovereign gives up that right when they enter
the social contract, but the sovereign is not a party to the contract and so
retains the broadest natural right of self-preservation, a right that includes the right to use preemptive violence against apparent threats. On
this account, the sovereign's power to punish "is not grounded on any
concession, or gift of the subjects,"4 9 and thus there is no logical contradiction between the sovereign's right to punish and the subject's right to
resist punishment.
Still, Hobbes's account may seem implausible and internally inconsistent. First, it is not clear why the sovereign-a human construct who
did not exist in the state of nature, an "artificial [person]" in Hobbes's
terminology 50-should have any naturalrights, including a natural right
to self-preservation. It may clarify things somewhat to rethink the concept of the state of nature, as I have suggested elsewhere,5t but Hobbes's
whether it actually deters the would-be wrongdoer. The primary function of a system
of punishment is to serve as a kind of psychological safety net, a reassurance from the
sovereign to the person who is willing to keep his promises ....
Id.
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 214.
Id. ("[Blefore the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to every thing,
and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or
killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing,
which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that
right, but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit,
for the preservation of them all . .
47

.

48

49 Id.

o Id. at 9.
Ristroph, supra note 32, at 614-15.

5'
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account of punishment still seems to rest on the attribution to the sovereign of a right that seems limitable to individual, mortal humans. 52 1
leave this issue aside here, for other apparent tensions in Hobbes's argument are more closely related to the questions of legal theory that motivate this Article.
For example, it is at times unclear whether Hobbesian subjects authorize the very punishments that they may rightfully resist. Hobbes
linked law with political authority, as we saw in Part I: A law is a command made by one with the right to rule, to one formerly obliged to
obey. Authority, in turn, is not a matter of superior physical strength but
a voluntary relationship between a principal ("author," to Hobbes) and
an agent. The scope of authority is a question of what has been authorized." When each subject transfers his right of self-governance to the
sovereign, he gives the sovereign a blank check and promises to pay
whatever the sovereign demands. Or so it seems at many points in
Hobbes's argument. With the initiation of the social contract, every subject is to "acknowledge himself to be [the] author of whatsoever [the
sovereign] shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern
the common peace and safety." 54 Do not subjects then authorize their
own punishments? Hobbes claimed just that on at least one instance,
speaking of a subject that attempted to depose the sovereign: "[If he] be
killed, or punished. . . for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the institution [the social contract] author of all his
sovereign shall do. .. ."" And on at least two other occasions, Hobbes
contemplated a subject's specific authorization of punishment. Each
Alice Ristroph, Covenants for the Sword, 61 U. Toronto L.J. 657, 661-68 (2011).
See Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 112.
54 Id. at 120.
s5 Id. at 122. Hobbes continued, "And because it is injustice for a man to do anything, for
which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust." Id. A few
pages later, Hobbes expanded the argument, but seemed also to change it:
[B]ecause every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of
the sovereign instituted, it follows, that whatsoever [the sovereign] does, it can be no
injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice.... [E]very particular man is author of all the sovereign does, and consequently
he that complains of injury from his sovereign complains of that whereof he himself is
author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself, no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible.
Id. at 124. In the first passage, the lawbreaker is unjust-to whom it is unclear-for inviting
his own punishment; in the second, the lawbreaker faces no injury and should complain to no
one, not even himself. Since Hobbes equated injury with injustice, the passages seem at
odds.
52

5
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time, the subject authorized his own punishment, but also retained a
right to resist. "For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or
so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me." 5 6
I do not think Hobbes resolved all the tensions in these claims. In
what sense is the first proposition-unless I do so, or so, kill meproperly called a covenant? What would it mean for me to keep that
covenant?" Moreover, framing authorization for punishment as a covenant with the sovereign is a contradiction of Hobbes's claims elsewhere
that subjects contract with one another, not with the sovereign. 8 On
Hobbes's own account, the sovereign who comes to kill the disobedient
subject is indifferent to whether the subject has said kill me or not. We
speak directly to the sovereign when we authorize him, but we do not
covenant with him. The account makes a little more sense if we take the
subject's own malfeasance out of the picture, and imagine instead an authorization of the institution of punishment in general: I authorizeyou to
make laws for myself and other subjects, and to punish those who break
the laws. That proposition is not clearly inconsistent with the subject's
own self-preservation, so long as he expects to comply with the laws.
And indeed, this is how some commentators read Hobbes on the authorization of punishment: We authorize one another's punishments, rather
than our own. 59
56 Id. at 98; see also Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: or The Citizen 39-40 (Sterling P.
Lamprecht ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1949) (1651) ("It is one thing, if I promise thus: if
I do it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you
should offer to kill me, I will not resist.").
57 Remember that according to Hobbes, we can contract only in our self-interest. On that
view, it may make sense for me to contract, I will obey you, and in exchange, you will not

kill me. Perhaps Hobbes would argue that this is the exact equivalent of unless I do so, or so,
kill me. It seems to me, though, that the first formulation-I will obey you-actually alters
the baseline rights of each party, while the second formulation simply states an option that
the potential ruler already enjoys under Hobbes's account of natural right. In contract terminology, there is no consideration in the exchange-unless I do so, or so, kill me-since the
other party already has the right to kill me in the state of nature. Perhaps it should also be
noted here that Hobbes defined a "covenant" as a subspecies of contract, one in which one
party performs immediately and trusts the other party to perform at some point in the future.
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 94. But it does not seem that this more precise definition
hel s establish unless I do so, or so, kill me, as a covenant.

See, e.g., id. at 122 ("[T]he right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they
make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them .... ).
s9 See, e.g., David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of
Thomas Hobbes 148 (1969) ("Each man authorizes, not his own punishment, but the punishment of every other man. The sovereign, in punishing one particular individual, does not
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We could explain this argument in terms of risk and certainty. A rational agent interested in self-preservation might reasonably consent to a
system in which she still faces some risks of being harmed or even
killed, so long as the system is less risky than the alternatives. When I
authorize the sovereign and a system of punishment, I face the risk that I
will be punished, but I can reasonably expect to avoid that outcome by
complying with the law. Once I have broken the law and am facing punishment, though, it is no longer a question of probabilities. It is never in
my interest to be punished, Hobbes would argue, and thus I may resist
punishment without running afoul of my prior covenants or doing injustice to anyone.
Now, one might reject Hobbes's account for any number of reasons.
One might dispute his understanding of human psychology; one might
argue that consent is the wrong standard for political legitimacy, or that
Hobbes counts too little or too much as valid consent; one might reject
his radical individualism. One might argue that humane and limited punishments are actually a service to the condemned rather than threats to
their self-preservation. Or one might argue that the sovereign's inevitable access to superior physical force renders the right to resist punishment uninteresting and inconsequential, nothing more than "the right to
kick and scream on the way to the gallows."60 My own view is that,
notwithstanding its various tensions and unresolved puzzles, Hobbes's
account of punishment is much more honest and insightful than prevailing alternatives, and I have suggested elsewhere ways in which this account could provoke fruitful rethinking of contemporary criminal law
and criminal procedure. 6 1 The inquiry of this Article is a bit more abstract: Does this curious account of punishment shed any light on the
broad jurisprudential effort to describe the concept of law?
act on the basis of his authorization from that individual, but on the basis of his authorization
from all other individuals.").
60 James R. Martel, The Radical Promise of Thomas Hobbes: The Road Not Taken in Liberal Theory, 4 Theory & Event, no. 2, 2000, ¶ 35.
6 See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law for Humans, in Hobbes and the Law, supra note

3, at 97, 97-98 (observing that Hobbes's criminal law theory and claims about punishment
are "the product of his unwavering attention to the humanity of the various persons who
make, break and enforce the criminal law"); Ristroph, supra note 46, at 28 (noting that

Hobbes's account of punishment "illustrates the strength of Hobbes's commitment to individual consent .. . [and his] unusual attentiveness to the fact that humans are embodied, vul-

nerable creatures"); Ristroph, supra note 32, at 622-23, 628-30 (suggesting Hobbes's account of punishment may better account for the treatment of defendants, especially with
respect to defendant rights).
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Far from being a crude precursor to Austin's sanction-based theory of
law, Hobbes's account insists on a conceptual separation between law
and the mechanisms of its enforcement. Obviously, Hobbes would not
deny the practical necessity of sanctions-though I think he would probably dispute the necessity, and wisdom, of the scale of modem American punishment. 62 Necessity does not imply normative legitimacy, however, and there is a legitimacy gap between law and the measures the
sovereign may need to take to enforce it. As a subject, I can authorize
the law itself. I can take full ownership of the sovereign's pronouncements of conduct rules and fully oblige myself to comply. I can even authorize decision rules-directives to public officials to impose sanctions
on violators.63 But I do not and cannot oblige myself to accept every
possible application of those decision rules. From my perspective as the
condemned, the act of punishment is not a valid exercise of political
power but the triumph of superior physical force over me.
The conceptual separation between conduct rules and enforcement
measures should not be taken as a denial that laws themselves, even just
the conduct rules, are coercive. The question whether law is coercive has
generated a fair amount of commentary, most of which reveals more
about the authors' various theories of coercion than it does about the
law.6" Hobbes did not delve into the term coercion, but he recognized
that laws would be experienced as burdens for many subjects much of

62

Further undermining his status as an absolutist and authoritarian, Hobbes urged minimalism with respect to punishment. For example, he identified forgiveness and mercy as
commands of the laws of nature: "[U]pon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon
the offenses past of them that repenting, desire it." Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 106.
63 The conduct rules/decision rules terminology was popularized by Meir Dan-Cohen, but
he drew the idea from Bentham, and Bentham probably got it from-whom else-Hobbes.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 626 & n.1, 627 (1984) (explaining the terms and tracing the
distinction "in modem times" to Bentham, though also noting a similar idea in Talmudic
law). Hobbes distinguished "distributive" laws, which determine the rights of subjects and
"speak to all the subjects," and "penal" laws, "which declare what penalty shall be inflicted
on those that violate the law, and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution."
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 197.
6 See, e.g., Hans Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law
and Legal Systems, 21 Am. J. Juris. 71, 88-93 (1976) (proposing that legal systems need not
be inherently coercive); Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2, 2-3
(2004) (arguing that the state's authority cannot be separated from its coercive power); Ekow
N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev.
1195, 1197 (2008) (suggesting that coercion is a central feature in explaining the law).
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the time: He characterized civil laws as "artificial chains," after all. 6 5 Political power is coercive, even if based on consent,'66 and law is an exercise of political power.
We speak colloquially of breaking the law. On prevailing accounts,
though, the law is actually impervious to breakage: Those who depart
from prescribed conduct rules merely set decision rules into action.
Once sanctions are imposed, the law has been vindicated rather than
damaged-or if it was once broken, it is now repaired. Hobbes offered
an alternative account in which violations of conduct rules are more significant. Violations mean the sovereign will no longer act with complete
authorization-unless he manages to overlook or forgive the violation,
but those are risky propositions too. When a law is violated, it is broken
in a way that punishment does not fully repair.
This is an account that emphasizes both the bilateral nature and the ultimate fragility of law. Law is bilateral, in that it is a command made
with authority, and authority is bilateral. The commander must be authorized and the subject must have previously obliged himself to obey.
Given that we can oblige ourselves to obey but not to accept theperhaps necessary-consequences of disobedience, the health of law depends on continued cooperation. If cooperation is withdrawn, the system
continues to function but it does so, at least in part, on the basis of a natural right to do violence, not on the basis of what Hobbes would properly call law. And indeed, Hobbes would remind us that law-what he
called civil law, or the law of a commonwealth as opposed to divine
law-is a human construct, as fragile and subject to decay as everything
else that mortals make.67
We are now in a position to consider the question raised and bracketed earlier: But was Hobbes right? I suspect many contemporary legal
theorists would endorse the general proposition that law is a human construct, but they might fault Hobbes for circumscribing possible legal
constructions with the inalienable right of self-preservation. To return to
the examples used earlier, why are conscription acts not properly called

65 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 147.
66 We agree, in the social contract, to take the will of the sovereign as our own. But this

agreement governs our actions, not our internal preferences. See discussion supra note 18. In
particular cases the will of the sovereign is likely to depart from what an individual subject
might choose, and under these circumstances the law is coercive by most understandings.
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 221 ("[N]othing can be immortal, which mortals
make.").
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law? Is it not obvious that, as a matter of pure description, these acts are
laws, and that even an act commanding testimony from criminal defendants or suicide from the very aged could meet the criteria for legal validity? A normatively constrained account of law-especially one subject
to Hobbes's peculiar normative constraints-seems so far from ordinary
usage that we may wonder whether it is useful.
III. JURISPRUDENCE AND THE MANTLE OF NATURE

We have seen that for Hobbes a natural right of self-preservation sets
boundaries to political obligation, and thus limits what can count as civil
law. Does this make Hobbes a natural law theorist after all? There is
something odd about trying to categorize Hobbes as either a legal positivist or a theorist of natural law, because both those terms have become
associated with a set of claims about law as an independent concept or
practice, one distinct from political affairs. Hobbes certainly made a
great many claims about law that are consistent with core claims of legal
positivists, and he made a few claims that are consistent with natural law
theorists.6 8 But in full measure, Hobbes's account of law does not attempt to explain law without a background account of its human participants and their relationships to one another. Law, as it interested
Hobbes, was a feature of the commonwealth, and so the definition of
law required an account of the commonwealth. It required an account
of political obligation and its limits, and this required an account of human nature. In contrast to many of those who read or dismiss him today,
Hobbes was antidisciplinarian with respect to scholarly inquiry. To be a
And so he has been located, by different readers, in both camps. See M.M. Goldsmith,
Hobbes on Law, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes 274, 275 (Tom Sorell ed., 1996)
("Hobbes is not only a command theorist but also a legal positivist."); Dieter Hiining,
Hobbes on the Right to Punish, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan 217,
226 (Patricia Springborg ed., 2007) ("Hobbes is a theoretician who grounds his system on
the conditions of reason and rational thought, and is not a legal positivist...."); Murphy,
sura note 10, at 849 (arguing that Hobbes was a natural law theorist).
9 Hobbes did speak of "divine" law on occasion, and he referred to "the kingdom of
God." See, e.g., Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 245. I believe, however, that his remarks
on these topics reinforce the interpretation offered here. For example, Hobbes claimed that
only rational beings, capable of understanding speech and responding to rewards and punishments, could be true subjects. Thus to speak of a "kingdom of God" that included animals
and plants was to use the word "kingdom" metaphorically. Id. Hobbes also distinguished
power from law, id. at 153, and suggested that while God has power over all objects, only
humans are subject to divine law. Id. at 245-46. I am grateful to Mark Murphy for pressing
me to consider these points.
68
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philosopher, he sought to learn science, and mathematics, and psychology. He certainly favored some methods of inquiry over others-he loved
geometry, and had little use for "ancient authors" 70-but he sought facts
wherever he could find them.'
Many commentators have misunderstood Hobbes on law because they
have read him as though he spoke about law without also talking about
politics. 7 2 It should be clear from the earlier discussions that Hobbes did
not try to disentangle law from political context. He was right to take
that approach, I believe, for reasons that should become more evident
shortly. In this final Part, I want to consider what light Hobbes's work
might shed on another debate in the field of jurisprudence, one that concerns a game we might call "Just the Facts Please," or purely descriptive
jurisprudence. Hobbes sought to describe law, but he recognized that
both law and language are human constructs. Because the very act of description is, at least in part, an act of construction, there may be no such
thing as "purely descriptive" jurisprudence.
Purportedly descriptive jurisprudence views law as a set of practices
that can be observed and described from a neutral, disinterested vantage
point. Hart famously described his project in these terms: "My account
is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it
does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the
forms and structures which appear in my general account of law. . . ."73
Since Hart, many other theorists have sought to offer descriptions of law

70
Id.
71 As

at 490.
captured by James Boyle:
[Hobbes] followed the path wherever it led. To understand society, you had to understand motion, and relationships, and universals, and essences, and sentiments, and optics, and who knows what else. So Hobbes wrote about them. He realized that most of
the questions with which he was dealing resolved themselves into questions about
epistemology-what is it to Know, to be Right? So he wrote about epistemology, and
politics, and legal theory, and biblical interpretation. If we are only now beginning to
see the connections between a theory of knowledge, a theory of interpretation, a theory of judicial review, and the legitimacy of the state, we cannot blame Hobbes.
James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 383, 425-26 (1987).
72 Speaking not of Hobbes, but of mainstream legal philosophy, Lewis Kornhauser noted
that "the philosophical debate over the concept of law treats the legal order as a largely autonomous set of norms rather than as an artifact of functioning institutions of the governance
structure." Lewis A. Kornhauser, Governance Structures, Legal Systems, and the Concept of
Law, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 355, 375 (2004).
7 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 240 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
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that are independent of evaluations of it, 74 and many others have questioned whether purely descriptive jurisprudence is possible. Those who
do want to play "Just the Facts" seek to deliver the empirical truth about
the particular human practice called law. Of course, the practice entails
many judgments and claims that are not themselves empirical or fixed.
Descriptions of law must capture its indeterminacies, its dynamisms, and
its evaluative aspects. But, the descriptive legal theorist would say, it is
possible to state the facts about law, even if law is not itself only about
facts-or as Hart put it, "Description may still be description, even when
what is described is an evaluation."7 6
Hobbes sought facts where he could find them, and he thought it crucial to begin inquiries into human affairs with an accurate statement of
facts. To understand politics, it was necessary to understand human beings, and thus the early chapters of Leviathan set forth Hobbes's materialist claims about persons and the world they live in, as well as his account of human psychology. He would eventually draw normative
implications from his empirical claims, of course, but he thought it important to get the facts right first. As with humans, so with law, it might
seem. Hobbes introduced his discussion of civil law with an apparent
claim to offer straight description, albeit from a layman's perspective:
"[M]y design [is] not to show what is law here, and there; but what is
law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and diverse others have done, without
taking upon them the profession of the study of the law."7 This statement of purpose seems to aspire to descriptive jurisprudence, and it
makes Hobbes's suggestion that a natural right to self-preservation restricts the content of the civil law all the more curious.
To see what Hobbes was doing, what descriptive jurisprudence is doing, and whether the two are the same thing, it is helpful to consider
closely the word that begins Leviathan and that peppers a great deal of
74 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral, 26
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 683, 683 (2006) (contending that legal positivism is merely descriptive, not normative).
7 Dworkin may be the best known critic of the "pure description" project, but in my view
other theorists' challenges are more interesting. See, e.g., Danny Priel, Evaluating Descriptive Jurisprudence, 52 Am. J. Juris. 139, 140 (2007) (suggesting that descriptive jurisprudence may be impossible); Jeremy Waldron, Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58
Emory L.J. 675, 677 (2009) (noting the "tacit sense that . . general [descriptive] jurisprudence is largely an inbred word game, of little interest to those who are really interested in
law").
76 Hart, supra note 73, at 244.
7 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 183 (emphasis omitted).
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legal theory: "Nature.", 8 Hobbes's claim of a natural right of selfpreservation is just one of many appeals he made to nature. He offered a
detailed account of human nature, of course, and gave an infamous account of the misery and strife that characterized the natural condition of
mankind. We exit this state of nature with the social contract (sort of):
You can take humans out of the state of nature, but you cannot take (the
state of) nature out of humans. Human psychology is not radically altered by political life, and so political institutions must recognize and
address the same self-interests, passions, desires, and other human traits
that characterized prepolitical man. The role of the natural in Hobbes's
work is perhaps best discerned by noticing what Hobbes usually juxtaposed to nature: the artificial, in the sense of human artifice-the things
we make ourselves. 9 Nature precedes or transcends human artifice. It is
what we do not get to choose, what we did not construct.
Invocations of nature also appear often in legal theory, but there they
do somewhat different work. Natural law theories have a long heritage,
if not very many vocal adherents at present. Curiously, or perhaps not,
the rejection of natural law theory has coincided with the rise of naturalism, a philosophical approach that emphasizes materialism, empiricism,
and scientific explanation.80 As characterized by Brian Leiter, naturalism
frames philosophy as "simply the abstract and reflective part of empirical science,"" and a naturalized jurisprudence would offer an empirically grounded, descriptive account of law. Naturalized jurisprudence
would state "Just the Facts"; for example, legal realism honors naturalism by offering "a descriptive and explanatory account of what input-

78 Consider as well the first sentence of Leviathan: "Nature (the art whereby
God has made
and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,
that it can make an artificial animal." Id. at 9. Many of Hobbes's readers, both in his own era
and in later ones, have suspected that for Hobbes, God did not actually have much to do with
it. See, e.g., Bramhall, supra note 3, at 116-39 (arguing that Hobbes's work was hostile to
Christianity and indeed to all religion). Whether Hobbes was a believer or not, this sentence
and Hobbes's many other references to nature make clear that for Hobbes, nature stands in
opposition to human artifice. We might imitate nature, but we do not construct it ourselves.
'9 See Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 9-10.
8 Cf. Dan Priel, Jurisprudence Between Science and the Humanities, 4 Wash. U. Juris.
Rev. 269, 279 n.25 (2012) (noting the confusion that arises because "natural law theories are
sometimes called naturalistic, even though such theories are often the exact opposite of what
most [philosophical] naturalists mean by the term").
81 Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 Am. J. Juris. 17, 50 (2003).
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that is, what combination of facts and reasons-produces what outputthat is, what judicial decision."82
Does anything connect these various appeals to nature in Hobbes, in
classic natural law theory, and in Leiter's naturalized jurisprudence? In
each case, the thinker who dons the mantle of nature disavows relativism
and subjectivity. Nature, he claims, is beyond argument, beyond choice.
It would be silly to argue about the temperature at which water boils.
Natural law, for Hobbes as well as for earlier thinkers, is noncontingent;
its content is determined by facts about the world rather than by the subjective preferences of any human ruler. Naturalized jurisprudence is
based on observable and verifiable facts about human practices. It is not
a normative theory about what law should be. Nature, in all these contexts, seems a way to end or avoid arguments-to show the pointlessness of argument-by focusing on what is not subject to reasonable dispute.
For Hobbes, facts were the place to begin an argument; as we have
seen, he thought it crucial to gather whatever empirical knowledge was
available in order to construct his political theory. One of the central
themes of Hobbes's work, though, is the idea that many human disagreements cannot be resolved by facts. We fight about nonempirical
questions-about what significance to attach to facts, or about what constitutes justice, or what counts as good. 84 That is why we need a sovereign: When the facts do not dictate an answer, the sovereign chooses
one. We could not get ourselves out of the misery and conflict of the
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex.
L. Rev. 267, 295, 315 (1997).
83 Hobbes did say that natural law actually restrains our actions only once a sovereign is in
place, and that subjects should rely on the sovereign's interpretation of what natural law requires, rather than their own interpretation or even that of the moral philosopher's. Hobbes,
Leviathan, supra note 1, at 191 ("The interpretation of the laws of nature, in a commonwealth, depends not on the books of moral philosophy.. . . That which I have written in this
treatise, concerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore presently law; but because in all commonwealths in the world, it is part of the civil law: For though it be naturally reasonable, yet
it is by the sovereign power that it is law. ). But the sovereign could not actually change
the content of natural law.
84 In correspondence with Hobbes, a young Frenchman suggested that the field of philosophy was itself a real-world manifestation of the state of nature, a war of all against all.
"[T]here are so many teachers of doctrines, and so many different sects. Each thinks he has
found the truth, and imagines that each and every one of the others is wrong ..... Richard
Tuck, Introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at ix, xxx (quoting a letter from
Frangois Peleau to Hobbes). We do not know if or how Hobbes replied to this suggestion.
82
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state of nature simply by studying, and the difficulty is not just that it is
impossible to research and learn in the midst of a war of all against all.85
Even if we gather all the facts we can, no amassing of facts, no amount
of empirical sleuthing will ever dictate the answers to life's persistent
questions.
Descriptive jurisprudence does not claim to answer all of life's persistent questions, of course. As propounded by Hart and others, it just purports to answer questions about the concept, or even the nature (that
word again!) of law. Law is a complex institution, as Hart argued, an array of identifiable practices that can be observed, studied, and explained. 7 Law includes practices designed to adjudicate disputes, including fundamental disputes about nonempirical questions, but we may
describe the practices without ourselves taking sides on the disputed
questions. Indeed, the institution of law may even rest on particular and
contested ideological presuppositions, and the explanation of legal practices may require an account of the ideological presuppositions of the
participants. In Hart's words again, though, "nothing in the project of a
descriptive jurisprudence .. . preclude[s] a non-participant external observer from describing the ways in which participants view the law from
such an internal point of view."88
And yet, Hart's own work should make us doubt the extent to which
jurisprudence can be purely descriptive. To be sure, there are practices
widely recognized as law that the scholar can describe. But the interesting questions about law are not ones on which there is consensus. The
"persistent questions" Hart identified at the outset of The Concept of
Law are persistently disputed, and the disputes persist because the questions are not empirical: "How does law differ from and how is it related
to orders backed by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and
how is it related to, moral obligation? What are rules and to what extent
is law an affair of rules?" 9 Law, like sovereignty, is a human artifice; it

8 See Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 89.
86 Garrison Keillor fans may recognize the signature of Guy Noir, Keillor's beleaguered
private eye: "one man [who] seeks the answers to life's persistent questions." Garrison Keillor, Guy Noir: Script, A Prairie Home Companion (Oct. 1, 2011), http://prairiehome.org/
script/guy-noir-october-1-2011/. Close readers of Hart might also remember that "Persistent
Questions" is the title of Part I of The Concept ofLaw. Hart, supra note 73, at 1.

8 Hart, supra note 73, at 239 (describing law as a "complex social and political institution
with a rule-govemed ... aspect").
18 Id. at 242.

" Id. at 13.
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has no nature in the Hobbesian sense. Law is not built by one person, or
by a small group in agreement. It is the product of the efforts of many,
and the participants in legal construction do not all agree about what
they are building.
Moreover, Hobbes would remind us, not only law but also language is
a human artifice. We choose how to use words, and we should do so deliberately and carefully. There is clearly an element of choice in labeling
something as law. This does not mean that we are free to use the word
however we please-we will get ourselves in a real mess if we do not
strive for consistent usage. 90 But it does mean that "law" is not something that just exists in the universe, like an acid or a base, ready to be
detected by scholars of jurisprudence with their philosophical equivalents of pH strips. Scholars may describe disputes about law, of course,
but if they adjudicate these disputes, they are no longer engaged in pure
description. And even if the scholar describes accurately a legal system's own rule to resolve disputes about what counts as law-such as
Hart's rule of recognition-we can be sure that second order disputes
about that rule will arise. And if the scholar maintains that no law exists
if there is dispute about the rule of recognition, he has, once again, taken
sides.9 ' Once Hart argued that international law was "not worth the title
of 'law,"' 92 it should have been clear, even to him, that he was evaluating as he was describing. At some point, one has to choose what needs
to be described, or what is worth being described. Indeterminacy is a
feature not just of the content of law, but of the concept of law. 93
The conceptual indeterminacy of the very word law afflicts both those
within a legal system and those who observe it from the outside, so the
point raised here is distinct from another challenge Ronald Dworkin and
90 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 28 ("[A] man that seeks precise truth had need to
remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will
find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs; the more he struggles, the more
belimed.").
91 These objections to descriptive jurisprudence are similar to those raised by Ronald
Dworkin at the beginning of Law's Empire. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 3-11 (1986). Of
course, to share Dworkin's skepticism about descriptive jurisprudence is not to endorse his
proposed alternative account. For more on these issues, see Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1216 (2009), responding to Scott J. Shapiro,
The 'Hart-Dworkin' Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in Ronald Dworkin 22, 49
(Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
92 Hart, supra note 73, at 220 (emphasis added).
93 See Liam Murphy, Better to See Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1088, 1093 (2008)
("[I]f there is a concept of law that 'we all share,' it is indeterminate or partly ambiguous.").
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others have raised against descriptive jurisprudence-the claim that an
account of law must emphasize or privilege the internal participant's
point of view rather than merely describe that point of view.9 4 Setting
aside the problem of conceptual indeterminacy, there is no reason (contrary to Dworkin's assertions) that a hypothetical external, nonparticipant observer could not give an account of legal practices. But it is
worth emphasizing that no such external observer exists. Did Hart think
of himself as a "nonparticipant" in the legal system? If he entertained
that illusion, he was able to do so only because the laws of Britain in the
twentieth century were structured so that Hart did not feel their burdens.
Or perhaps he felt the burdens acutely as a private citizen, but nevertheless adopted the nonparticipant's view as a heuristic device.95 In reality,
every citizen of an organized society is a participant of a legal system, at
least as a subject even if not as a litigant, practicing attorney, judge, or
other public official. Law professors, of course, participate much more
in the legal system than do most ordinary citizens, insofar as they claim
expertise about either the content or concept of law as they teach or
write.
With these reflections in mind, we might view a little differently the
question, but was Hobbes right? Hobbes made factual claims, of course;
he purported to base his entire argument on a specific (and perhaps
flawed) empirical account of the world. But no reader has failed to understand that Hobbes was making an argument on the basis of the facts
as he perceived them. Indeed, the fact that Hobbes was reacting to the
political tumult of his time is central to most interpretations of his work.
As for jurisprudence, although he scorned the claims of "subordinate
judges" to ascertain the law by wisdom,9 6 Hobbes himself undertook the
jurisprudential project of providing a general account of law, as we have
seen. But he never claimed to do so as a nonparticipant, and he never
claimed to be disinterested. He addressed himself to sovereigns, and to
his fellow subjects. He was in it, in the thick of things, and so are we all.

See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 91, at 13-14.
Hart described himself as a "suppressed homosexual" at a time when homosexuality was
socially condemned and to some extent, legally burdened. See Nicola Lacey, A Life of
H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream 61-62 (2004).
96 Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 1, at 187 ("[I]t is not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of
subordinate judges; but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his
command, that makes law.").
94
9
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There are at least two ways to understand what Hobbes says about the
natural right of self-preservation. It is possible that he was making a positivist claim, asserting that human psychology is such that a legal system
will not work if it does not accommodate self-preservation. As I suggested above, however, I think we can also understand his claim as a
normative one about what we should expect of each other. A natural
right, after all, is a blameless liberty, so to assert a right for Hobbes is to
set limits to blame. Were Hobbes to borrow Hart's terminology, he
might have suggested that if commands fail to acknowledge or respect
the subject's interest in self-preservation, they are "not worth the title of
'law."' 9 But this means, as we have seen, that the necessary institution
of punishment rests on the triumph of superior physical force, and not on
the command-obligation combination that constitutes law.
Thus rereading Hobbes on law and punishment shows that his normative vision was very different-and in my view, much more attractivethan the authoritarianism or even totalitarianism with which he is too often branded. Hobbes did try to close the door against subversion; he
leaned hard on that door, threw all his weight against it, and nearly shut it
completely. But Hobbes was honest, and Hobbes would not cheat. Having
embraced a theory of individual equality and natural liberty, he did the
very best he could to give an account of political power consistent with
those principles. He recognized the danger of subversion and of disobedience; he was acutely aware of the fragility of human constructs, including
the social contract and sovereign power. And Hobbes believed that most
of the time, the interests of the free and equal individual could be served
well, or at least be served best, by a powerful sovereign. But when the going got tough, in instances when it became clear that the interests of the
individual and those of the sovereign would collide, Hobbes would not
cheat. He would not succumb to the temptation that would seduce Kant,
and many liberals thereafter, and resolve the conflict by appealing to the
individual's better self. Hobbes simply admitted that law is a pretty good
system as long as individuals consent and comply, and when they do not,
the ensuing and often necessary punishment is a regrettable re-emergence
of the rule of might. And in that recognition, we have the germs of subversion, the seeds of resistance that Hobbes could not eradicate.

9

Hart, supra note 73, at 220.

